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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The state makes no attempt to argue that the sentence in this case was legally
imposed. In light of this Court's decision in State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, there is
no question this sentence was imposed illegally and must be vacated.
The state's request that the appeal be dismissed fails. The record does not
demonstrate a knowing, intentional and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal. Due
process, fairness and the integrity of the criminal justice system require that this case be
decided on the merits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE SENTENCE WAS PATENTLY ILLEGAL.
The state makes no attempt to argue that the sentence imposed in this case did not
violate Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process. Given this Court's decision in State v.
WanosiL 2001 Utah App. 241, its treatment of additional defendants raising similar

issues (see e.g. State v. Samora. 2001 UT App 266 (vacating sentence imposed in a
similar manner)), and the added fact in this case that Vicente spoke Spanish and there is
no record showing that he was informed in Spanish of the sentencing date, there is no
question that this sentence was illegally imposed and should be vacated.
POINT II. THE FACT THAT VICENTE HAS NOT BEEN ARRESTED
ON THE PENDING BENCH WARRANT AND IS THEREFORE NOT
YET SERVING THE ILLEGAL SENTENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE
DISMISSAL OF THIS APPEAL.
Despite the fact that there is no question that this sentence was illegally imposed
and must be vacated, the state claims that because Vicente "did not appear at sentencing
and has not subsequently appeared1' (State's brief at 4), this Court should dismiss this
appeal. The state's claim fails because Just as Vicente did not knowingly and voluntarily
waive his right to presence at sentencing (see Appellant's opening brief at 15-26), he
likewise did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal. Moreover, because
there is no question the sentencing procedure violated due process and Utah R. Crim,
22(a) and it takes a significant amount of time to resolve an appeal, this illegal sentence
should be vacated at this juncture rather than requiring Vicente to be held under the
unlawful sentence before allowing him to overturn it on appeal.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to
appeal a criminal conviction. That right is "essential to a fair criminal proceeding" and
cannot be lightly forfeited. State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). In a case such
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who escapes does not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal. In this case
where Vicente does not speak English and the record does not indicate that he was
informed in Spanish of the sentencing date or otherwise establish that he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to presence at sentencing, the fact that Vicente has not been
arrested on the bench warrant does not amount to a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
right to appeal.
In addition, even if Hardy still allows for dismissal of an appeal when a defendant
escapes, it would not require dismissal in this case. The holding in Hardy was based on
the Court's determination that it would be unfair to allow Hardy to appeal because the
state would be unable to enforce any judgment in its favor. Hardy, 636 P.2d at 474 ("'the
escaped prisoner should not be able to reap the benefit of a decision in his favor when the
state could not enforce a decision jn its favor"1) (citation omitted).
By contrast, in the present case, no unfairness exists in allowing the appeal to
proceed even though the defendant is still absent. If the state were to win on appeal, it
could enforce a favorable ruling just as it could and did without the appeal by proceeding
with the sentencing in absentia. In other words, despite Vicente's absence, the state was
able to proceed with sentencing and obtain a severe sentence which is currently in place.
If the state were to win on appeal and have that sentence affirmed, the state would be in
the same position of enforcing the in absentia sentence as it was when the trial court went
forward with sentencing; hence, there is no unfairness to the state in proceeding with the
4

appeal. In fact, unfairness would exist only if the state were permitted to sentence a
defendant even though he was absent, and the defendant was then precluded from
appealing the illegal sentence because of his absence.
Additionally, given this Court's recent decision in Wanosik and its subsequent
rulings in various cases raising similar sentencing issues, it is evident that this sentence
was illegally entered and will be vacated. Any concern that proceeding with the appeal
would be unfair because the state could not enforce a ruling in its favor is irrelevant in
this case where the state will not prevail.
Moreover, Vicente did not escape; instead, he did not appear at a sentencing.
While Hardy had an appeal in place and nevertheless chose to leave, thereby arguably
abandoning his appeal, Vicente did not know that the case would proceed in his absence
and therefore did not knowingly abandon his right to presence at sentencing or his right to
appeal. The state has reaped the benefit of sentencing Vicente in absentia; an illegal
sentence of one year is in place and will be enforced when Vicente is arrested unless this
Court vacates the sentence. It would be fundamentally unfair to allow the state to proceed
with sentencing in absentia then refuse to review that sentence where the state has
proceeded despite Vicente's absence and benefitted from that absence.
This Court's decision in State v. Mova. 815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1991) also
supports Vicente's claim that this appeal should proceed. In Moya, this Court decided the
merits of Appellant's claims even though Moya was "a fugitive from the criminal justice
5

system." I d at 1318 (Bench, J., dissenting). Although one judge thought the appeal
should be dismissed, the majority rejected that notion and decided the appeal on its merits
even though Moya had absconded. The fact that the majority considered the issue
suggests that (1) review was required to protect the fundamental right to appeal, and (2)
Moya's fugitive status did not establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to
appeal. Like the present case, the issue raised in Moya went to the heart of whether the
sentence was legal, making an appeal essential to a fair proceeding regardless of whether
Moya was in custody.
If this Court were to dismiss this appeal, it would create the ultimate unfair
paradox: a trial court could illegally sentence a defendant in his absence, but the
defendant could not ask a higher court to review the illegality of the sentence because he
was absent. In other words, absence from the proceedings would affect the ability to go
forward only when proceeding might benefit the defendant. A judge could impose an
illegal sentence on an absent defendant without ramifications. Such an approach would
severely undermine the integrity of the system.
Finally, because appeals often take more than a year, if Vicente's appeal is put on
hold until he is arrested, he will receive little or no benefit from a positive result because
he will have been held pursuant to the illegal sentence while waiting for his appeal to be
resolved. This, too, would undermine the integrity of the system by allowing courts to
impose and carry out illegal sentences without review until after the defendant has been
6

required to serve the sentence. The fundamental nature of the right to appeal and fairness
require that this Court review at this point the legality of the sentencing procedure utilized
by the trial court in sentencing Vicente. In this case where there is no question that the
sentence was illegally imposed and where Vicente has not knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to be present for sentencing, let alone his right to appeal, this Court
should deny the state's request that the appeal be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant/Defendant Jose Luis Vicente respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the illegally imposed sentence and remand the case for a full and fair sentencing hearing.
SUBMITTED this &?tt day of January, 2002.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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